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1 Introduction 
Policy and treatment evaluation typically aims at assessing the causal effect of an intervention 
or treatment on an outcome of interest. In many cases, however, not only the (total) treatment 
effect appears interesting, but also the causal mechanisms through which it materializes. Causal 
mediation analysis (Robins and Greenland, 1992; Pearl, 2001; Robins, 2003) therefore aims at 
disentangling the direct effect of the treatment on the outcome as well as the indirect effects 
operating through one or more intermediate variables, also called mediators. 
The main contribution of this paper is the proposition of a difference-in-differences (DiD) 
approach for separating direct and indirect effects within subpopulations (or strata) defined 
upon the reaction of a binary mediator to the treatment. Borrowing from the nomenclature in 
Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996), we demonstrate under which assumptions direct effects for 
“always” and “never takers”, whose binary mediator is independent of the treatment always or 
never one, or of the direct and indirect effects on the compliers, whose mediator value always 
corresponds to the treatment state, are identified. Among others, random treatment assignment, 
monotonicity of the mediator in the treatment, and specific common trend assumptions across 
strata are imposed for identification.  
In contrast to our approach, a good part of the literature on causal mediation analysis 
assumes conditional exogeneity of the treatment (given observed covariates) and the mediator 
(given the treatment and the covariates), which requires observing all confounders of the 
treatment and the mediator. Such “sequential ignorability” is for instance imposed in Petersen, 
Sinisi, and van der Laan (2006), Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2009), VanderWeele (2009), Imai, 
Keele, and Yamamoto (2010), Hong (2010), Tchetgen Tchetgen and Shpitser (2012), Zheng 
and van der Laan (2012), and Huber (2014). Alternatively, relatively few contributions 
consider identification based on instruments, see for instance Imai, Tingley, and Yamamoto 
(2013), Yamamoto (2013), and Frölich and Huber (2014). Our paper is to the best of our 
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knowledge the first one to offer an alternative to sequential ignorability and instrumental 
variable assumptions based on a DiD approach in the context of mediation analysis.  
While most mediation studies focus on the total population, comparably few contributions 
discuss effects in subpopulations (or principal strata, see Frangakis and Rubin, 2002) defined 
upon the value of the binary mediator as a function of the treatment, see for instance Rubin 
(2004). Principal stratification in the context of mediation has been criticized for typically not 
permitting a decomposition of direct and indirect effects among compliers and focussing on 
subgroups that may be less interesting than the entire population, see VanderWeele (2008; 2012). 
We contribute to this discussion by showing that direct and indirect effects on compliers are 
identified in a DiD framework under particular conditions and by presenting an empirical 
application in which the effect on subgroups is relevant for political decision making. 
We apply our method to investigate the effect of the Vietnam draft lottery in the years 1969 
to 1972 in the US on political preferences, personal views on war policies, and personal 
attitudes. Our mediator of interest is military service during the Vietnam War. We note that a 
subset of individuals (compliers) was induced by the lottery to serve in the army either through 
being drafted or “voluntarily” joining the military in case of an unfavourable lottery outcome 
(Angrist, 1991), while others avoided the draft (never takers) for instance through college 
deferments (Card and Lemieux, 2001; Kuziemko, 2010; Deuchert and Huber, 2014), or would 
have served in any case (always takers). We aim at estimating the direct effects of the draft 
lottery on the never takers, as well as the direct and indirect effect (via military service) on the 
compliers.  
This is a particularly interesting application for several reasons: First, the recent literature 
argues that party preferences and political attitudes are endogenous to policy changes (Bergan, 
2009; Erikson and Stoker, 2011), which is in contrast to most economic models. Erikson and 
Stoker (2011) use the Vietnam draft lottery to estimate the impact of receiving an unfavourable 
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lottery number on party preferences and political attitudes in a highly selected sample of young 
college-bound men and conclude that a change in the draft risk increases support for the 
Democratic Party. Using a sample of 115 male students from the 1972 class of the University of 
Virginia, Bergan (2009) shows that the draft induced those with unfavourable lottery numbers 
to be more strongly in favour of an immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. We challenge these 
results, estimating the impact of the draft on political preferences in a more representative 
sample. Second, we go beyond the intention to treat effect and specifically consider 
heterogeneity in the response to the draft across strata. The previous literature analysing the 
impact of the Vietnam War lottery typically assumes that the Vietnam War lottery impacts 
outcomes only via military service and thus assumes that the direct effect of the lottery is equal 
to zero (Angrist, Chen, and Frandsen, 2010; Angrist, 1990) for any population. We challenge 
this assumption, too. 
In contrast to Erikson and Stoker (2011) and Bergan (2009), we find that the draft lottery 
significantly increases the probability to vote Republican, but has no effects on Vietnam War 
attitudes. When decomposing the average treatment effect into direct and indirect effects within 
strata, the electoral results are no longer significant. Taken at face value, the point estimates 
suggest that the overall effect appears to be largely driven by compliers who increase their 
relative support for the Republicans. However, both the total and indirect effects on compliers 
are far smaller than the local average treatment effect (LATE) estimate on compliers, which 
relies on the lottery being a valid instrument for military service. This points to the 
non-robustness of the results across various econometric approaches, as the true LATE equals 
the true indirect effect among compliers (for whom the first stage is one by definition) in the 
absence of direct effects.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the econometric 
framework, i.e., the effects of interest and the identifying assumptions underlying our DiD 
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approach. Section 3 presents an empirical application to the Vietnam draft lottery in which the 
total effects as well as the direct and indirect effects on political preferences and personal views 
on war and other governmental policies are estimated for various strata. Section 4 concludes. 
The appendix includes among other a simulation study to provide some intuition for scenarios 
in which the various identifying assumptions are satisfied or violated.  
2 Econometric framework 
2.1 Notation and definition of direct and indirect effects 
Let 𝑍𝑍 denote a binary treatment (e.g., being chosen for military service in a draft lottery) and 
𝐷𝐷 a binary intermediate variable or mediator that may be a function of 𝑍𝑍 (e.g., an indicator for 
actual military service). Furthermore, let 𝑇𝑇 indicate a particular time period: 𝑇𝑇 = 0 denotes 
the baseline period prior to assignment of 𝑍𝑍  and 𝐷𝐷 , 𝑇𝑇 = 1  the follow up period after 
measuring 𝐷𝐷 and 𝑍𝑍 in which the effect of the outcome is evaluated. Finally, let 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 denote the 
outcome of interest (e.g., political preference) in period 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑡𝑡. Indexing the outcome by the 
time period 𝑡𝑡 ∈ {1,0} implies that it may be measured both in the baseline period and after the 
assignment of 𝑍𝑍 and 𝐷𝐷. To define the parameters of interest, we make use of the potential 
outcome notation, see for instance Rubin (1974), and denote by 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡(𝑧𝑧,𝑑𝑑) the potential outcome 
for treatment state 𝑍𝑍 = 𝑧𝑧  and mediator state 𝐷𝐷 = 𝑑𝑑  in time 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑡𝑡,  with 𝑧𝑧, 𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ {1,0} . 
Furthermore, let 𝐷𝐷(𝑧𝑧)  denote the potential mediator as a function of the treatment state 
𝑧𝑧 ∈ {1,0}. For notational ease, we will not use a time index for 𝐷𝐷 and 𝑍𝑍, because each of these 
parameters are assumed to be measured at a single period between 𝑇𝑇 = 0 and 𝑇𝑇 = 1 (but not 
necessarily the same period, as 𝐷𝐷 causally precedes 𝑍𝑍).  
Using this notation, the average treatment effect (ATE) in the follow up period is defined as 
∆1= 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1�1,𝐷𝐷(1)� − 𝑌𝑌1�0,𝐷𝐷(0)��. That is, the ATE corresponds to the cumulative effect of 𝑍𝑍 
on the outcome that either affects the latter directly (i.e., net of any effect on the mediator) or 
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indirectly through an effect on 𝐷𝐷. Indeed, the total ATE can be disentangled into the direct and 
indirect effects, denoted by 𝜃𝜃1(𝑧𝑧) = 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1�1,𝐷𝐷(𝑧𝑧)� − 𝑌𝑌1�0,𝐷𝐷(𝑧𝑧)��  and 𝛿𝛿1(𝑧𝑧) =
𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1�𝑧𝑧,𝐷𝐷(1)� − 𝑌𝑌1�𝑧𝑧,𝐷𝐷(0)�� , by adding and subtracting 𝑌𝑌1�1,𝐷𝐷(0)�  or 𝑌𝑌1�0,𝐷𝐷(1)� , 
respectively:  
∆1= 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1�1,𝐷𝐷(1)� − 𝑌𝑌1�0,𝐷𝐷(0)��    = 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1�1,𝐷𝐷(0)� − 𝑌𝑌1�0,𝐷𝐷(0)�� + 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1�1,𝐷𝐷(1)� − 𝑌𝑌1�1,𝐷𝐷(0)��    = 𝜃𝜃1(0) +  𝛿𝛿1(1)    = 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1�1,𝐷𝐷(1)� − 𝑌𝑌1�0,𝐷𝐷(1)�� + 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1�0,𝐷𝐷(1)� − 𝑌𝑌1�0,𝐷𝐷(0)��     = 𝜃𝜃1(1) +  𝛿𝛿1(0) 
Distinguishing between 𝜃𝜃1(1) and 𝜃𝜃1(0) or 𝛿𝛿1(1) and 𝛿𝛿1(0), respectively, implies the 
possibility of interaction effects between 𝑍𝑍  and 𝐷𝐷  such that the effects could be 
heterogeneous across values 𝑧𝑧 = 1 and 𝑧𝑧 = 0. For instance, 𝛿𝛿1(1) and 𝛿𝛿1(1) might differ if 
the military unit (and war experience) one is assigned to when being chosen through the draft 
lottery is different than when joining the army voluntarily without being drafted, which may 
have an impact on political attitude. Furthermore, note that if 𝑍𝑍 was a valid instrument for 𝐷𝐷 
that satisfied the exclusion restriction, as for instance assumed in Angrist (1990) in the context 
of the Vietnam draft lottery, any direct effect 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡(𝑧𝑧) would be zero and the indirect 𝛿𝛿1(1) =
𝛿𝛿1(0) = 𝛿𝛿1  would correspond to the so-called intention to treat effect. In our empirical 
application outlined below, we do not impose this strong assumption, which has for instance 
been challenged in Deuchert and Huber (2014), but explicitly allow for direct effects. 
In our approach we consider the concepts of direct and indirect effects within subgroups or 
so-called principal strata in the denomination of Frangakis and Rubin (2002) that are defined 
upon the values of the potential mediator. As outlined in Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) in 
the context of instrumental variable-based identification, any individual 𝑖𝑖 in the population 
belongs to one of four strata, henceforth denoted by 𝜏𝜏, according to their potential mediator 
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status (now indexed by 𝑖𝑖) under either treatment state: always takers (𝑎𝑎:𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(1) = 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(0) = 1) 
whose mediator is always one, compliers ( 𝑐𝑐:𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(1) = 1,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(0) = 0 ) whose mediator 
corresponds to the treatment value, defiers (𝑑𝑑:𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(1) = 0,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(0) = 1) whose mediator opposes 
the treatment value, and never takers (𝑛𝑛:𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(1) = 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(0) = 0) whose mediator is never one. 
Note that 𝜏𝜏 cannot be pinned down for any individual, because either 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(1) or 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(0) is 
observed, but never both.  
Introducing some further stratum-specific notation, let ∆1𝜏𝜏= 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1�1,𝐷𝐷(1)� −
𝑌𝑌1�0,𝐷𝐷(0)��𝜏𝜏� denote the ATE conditional on 𝜏𝜏 ∈ {𝑎𝑎,𝑛𝑛, 𝑐𝑐, 𝑑𝑑}; 𝜃𝜃1𝜏𝜏(𝑧𝑧) and 𝛿𝛿1𝜏𝜏(𝑧𝑧) denote the 
corresponding direct and indirect effects. Because 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(1) = 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(0) = 0 for any never taker, the 
indirect effect for this group is by definition zero (𝛿𝛿1𝑛𝑛(𝑧𝑧) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(𝑧𝑧, 0) − 𝑌𝑌1(𝑧𝑧, 0)|𝑛𝑛] = 0) and 
∆1
𝑛𝑛= 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1,0) − 𝑌𝑌1(0,0)|𝑛𝑛] = 𝜃𝜃1𝑛𝑛(1) = 𝜃𝜃1𝑛𝑛(0) = 𝜃𝜃1𝑛𝑛 corresponds to the direct effect (and an 
analogous argument applies to the always takers). For the compliers, both direct and indirect 
effects may exist. Note that 𝐷𝐷(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑧𝑧 due to the definition of compliers. Therefore, 𝜃𝜃1𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧) =
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1, 𝑧𝑧) − 𝑌𝑌1(0, 𝑧𝑧)|𝑐𝑐] and 𝛿𝛿1𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(𝑧𝑧, 1) − 𝑌𝑌1(𝑧𝑧, 0)|𝑐𝑐]. Furthermore, in the absence of 
any direct effect, the indirect effects on the compliers are homogenous, 𝛿𝛿1𝑐𝑐(1) = 𝛿𝛿1𝑐𝑐(0) = 𝛿𝛿1𝑐𝑐, 
and correspond to the LATE.   
2.2 Identifying assumptions 
We subsequently discuss the identifying assumptions along with the effects that may be 
obtained. We start by assuming independence between the treatment and potential mediators or 
outcomes: 
 
Assumption 1: Independence of 𝑍𝑍 and potential mediators/outcomes 
{𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡(𝑧𝑧,𝑑𝑑),𝐷𝐷(𝑧𝑧)} ⊥ 𝑍𝑍, for all 𝑧𝑧,𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡 ∈ {1,0} 
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Assumption 1 implies that there are no confounders jointly affecting the treatment and the 
mediator and/or outcome and is satisfied under treatment randomization as in successfully 
conducted experiments or (draft) lotteries. Our subsequent identification results could easily be 
adjusted to the case that independence only holds conditional on a vector of observed 
covariates. However, for the sake of ease of notation, we do not consider covariates and note 
that under conditional independence, any result holds within cells defined upon covariate 
values.    
Assumption 2: Weak monotonicity of 𝐷𝐷 in 𝑍𝑍 
Pr�𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(1) ≥ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(0)� = 1 
Assumption 2 is standard in the literature on local average treatment effects (see Imbens and 
Angrist, 1994, and Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996) and rules out the existence of defiers.  
Assumption 3: No anticipation effect of D and Z in the baseline period 
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(𝑧𝑧,𝑑𝑑) − 𝑌𝑌0(𝑧𝑧′,𝑑𝑑′)|𝜏𝜏] = 0, for 𝑧𝑧, 𝑧𝑧′,𝑑𝑑,𝑑𝑑′ ∈ {1,0} 
Assumption 3 rules out anticipation effects of the treatment or the mediator w.r.t. to the 
outcome in the baseline period.  
As shown in the appendix, Assumptions 1 to 3 imply that 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1,1) − 𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑐𝑐] = ∆0𝑐𝑐=0 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 1) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 0). Therefore, a rejection of the testable implication 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 =1) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 0) = 0 in the data would point to a violation of our identifying assumptions. 
Furthermore, Assumption 1 allows identifying the average treatment effect in the total 
population 
∆1= 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 1] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 0]. 
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Moreover, Assumptions 1 and 2 yield the strata proportions, which we denote by 𝑝𝑝𝜏𝜏 = Pr (𝜏𝜏), 
as functions of the conditional treatment probabilities given the instrument, which we denote by 
𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑|𝑧𝑧 = Pr(𝐷𝐷 = 𝑑𝑑|𝑍𝑍 = 𝑧𝑧) for 𝑑𝑑, 𝑧𝑧 in {1,0}: 
𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎 = 𝑝𝑝1|0,𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 = 𝑝𝑝1|1 − 𝑝𝑝1|0, 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 = 𝑝𝑝0|1. 
Finally, under Assumptions 1 to 3, the differences in average baseline outcomes across always 
or never takers and compliers are identified by  
E[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑎𝑎] − E[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑐𝑐] = 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎 + 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 [E(𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 1) − E(𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 1)], 
E[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑛𝑛] − E[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑐𝑐] = 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 + 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 [E(𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 0) − E(𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 0)], 
see equations (A5) and (A16) in the appendix. However, to identity direct and indirect effects 
for any of these groups, we need to impose some further assumptions.  
In contrast to the previous literature which mainly relies on sequential conditional 
independence or (in considerably fewer cases) on instruments, we subsequently base 
identification on so-called common trend assumptions, as they are also used for the evaluation 
of total treatment effects based on difference-in-differences (DiD) across treatment groups, see 
e.g., Lechner (2011) for a survey. In contrast to the standard framework that aims at resolving 
treatment endogeneity, we impose common trend assumptions across strata to tackle 
endogeneity due to conditioning on the potential mediator states (through the definition of the 
strata), while the treatment is random by Assumption 1. This allows for differences in the 
effects of unobserved confounders on specific potential outcomes across strata, as long as these 
differences are time constant.  
Assumption 4: Common trends for compliers and never takers under 𝑧𝑧 = 0 and 𝑑𝑑 = 0 
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,0)|𝑛𝑛] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑛𝑛] =  𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,0)|𝑐𝑐] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑐𝑐] 
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Assumption 4 states that the difference in mean potential outcomes under 𝑧𝑧 = 0 and 𝑑𝑑 = 0 
over time is identical for never takers and compliers or equivalently (by rearranging terms), that 
the difference in mean potential outcomes under 𝑧𝑧 = 0 and 𝑑𝑑 = 0 across compliers and never 
taker is constant over time. Under our assumptions, the average direct effect on the never takers 
is identified based on four conditional means, as outlined in Theorem 1.  
Theorem 1: Direct effect on the never takers 
Under Assumptions 1 to 4, the average direct effect on the never takers is identified by a DiD 
approach among those with 𝐷𝐷 = 0: 
𝜃𝜃1
𝑛𝑛 = [𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 0) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 0)]
− [𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 0) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 0)] 
Proof: See appendix. 
The next restriction imposes a common trend restriction w.r.t. potential outcomes of the 
always takers and compliers under 𝑧𝑧 = 1 and 𝑑𝑑 = 1.  
Assumption 5: Common trends for compliers and always takers under 𝑧𝑧 = 1 and 𝑑𝑑 = 1 
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1,1)|𝑎𝑎] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1,1)|𝑎𝑎] = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1,1)|𝑐𝑐] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1,1)|𝑐𝑐]. 
Assumption 5 appears somewhat harder to grasp than the restriction on potential outcomes 
under 𝑧𝑧 = 0 and d=0 imposed by Assumption 4. Together with Assumption 3, which implies 
that 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1,1)|𝑎𝑎] = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑎𝑎]  and 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1,1)|𝑐𝑐] = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑐𝑐] , Assumption 5 either 
requires (i) that 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,0)|𝑎𝑎] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑎𝑎] = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,0)|𝑐𝑐] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑐𝑐] (common trend 
in mean potential outcomes under 𝑧𝑧 = 0 and 𝑑𝑑 = 0) and that 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1,1)|𝑎𝑎] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,0)|𝑎𝑎] =
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1,1)|𝑐𝑐] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,0)|𝑐𝑐] such that the mean effects of 𝑍𝑍 and 𝐷𝐷 that are homogeneous 
across strata, or (ii) that [𝑌𝑌1(0,0)|𝑎𝑎] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑎𝑎] ≠ 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,0)|𝑐𝑐] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑐𝑐]  and 
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1,1)|𝑎𝑎] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,0)|𝑎𝑎] ≠ 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1,1)|𝑐𝑐] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,0)|𝑐𝑐]  in a very specific way that 
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satisfies Assumption 5. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 5, the direct effect on the always takers 
is identified. 
Theorem 2: Direct effect on the always takers  
Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 5, the average direct effect on the always takers is identified 
by a DiD approach among those with 𝐷𝐷 = 1: 
𝜃𝜃1
𝑎𝑎 = {𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 1]}
− {𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 1]} 
Proof: See appendix.  
Imposing Assumptions 1-5 identifies the average treatment effects on the compliers.  
Theorem 3: Average treatment effect on the compliers  
Under Assumptions 1 to 5, 
∆1
𝑐𝑐= 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 0] 
−
𝑝𝑝1|0
𝑝𝑝1|1 − 𝑝𝑝1|0 {𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 1]} + 𝑝𝑝0|1
𝑝𝑝0|0 − 𝑝𝑝0|1 {𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 0] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 0]} 
Proof: See appendix.  
Alternatively to identification based on Assumption 5, one may rule out a direct effect on the 
always takers per assumption.  
Assumption 6: Zero direct effect on always takers 
𝜃𝜃1
𝑎𝑎 = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1,1)|𝑎𝑎] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,1)|𝑎𝑎] = 0 
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Assumption 6 is an exclusion restriction as standardly used in the instrumental variable 
literature, however, with the difference that it is only imposed w.r.t. the stratum of always 
takers. This again allows identifying the total effect on the compliers.  
Theorem 4: Average treatment effect on the compliers  
Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, 
∆1
𝑐𝑐= 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1𝐷𝐷|𝑍𝑍 = 1] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1𝐷𝐷|𝑍𝑍 = 0]
𝑝𝑝1|1 − 𝑝𝑝1|0 − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 0] + 𝑝𝑝0|1
𝑝𝑝0|0 − 𝑝𝑝0|1 {𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 0] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 0]} 
Proof: See appendix.  
Assumptions 7 and 8 represent further common trend assumptions that allow disentangling 
the total effect on the compliers into direct and indirect effects when being combined with the 
previous assumptions.  
Assumption 7: Common trends for compliers and never takers under 𝑧𝑧 = 1 and 𝑑𝑑 = 0  
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1,0)|𝑛𝑛] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1,0)|𝑛𝑛] = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1,0)|𝑐𝑐] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1,0)|𝑐𝑐]. 
Assumption 7 imposes a common trend restriction w.r.t. the potential outcomes of never takers 
and compliers under 𝑧𝑧 = 1 and 𝑑𝑑 = 0. Together with Assumptions 3 and 4, this implies that Z 
has the same direct effect among compliers and never takers for 𝑑𝑑 = 0. To see this, first note 
that under Assumption 3, the expression in Assumption 7 becomes 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1,0)|𝑛𝑛] −
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑛𝑛] = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1,0)|𝑐𝑐] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑐𝑐]. Subtracting from the right and left hand side of 
the latter expression the right and left hand side of Assumption 4, respectively, yields 
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1,0)|𝑛𝑛] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,0)|𝑛𝑛] = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1,0)|𝑐𝑐] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,0)|𝑐𝑐]. Assumption 7 is required for the 
identification of the direct effect under non-treatment and the indirect effect under treatment 
among compliers. For the latter effect, we derive the results by either imposing Assumption 5 
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(common trends for compliers and always takers under 𝑧𝑧 = 1 and 𝑑𝑑 = 1) or Assumption 6 (no 
direct effect on always takers). 
Theorem 5: Direct effect under 𝑧𝑧 = 0 and indirect effect under 𝑧𝑧 = 1 on compliers  
Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7, 
𝜃𝜃1
𝑐𝑐(0) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 0] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 0] 
+𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1 − 𝐷𝐷)|𝑍𝑍 = 0] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1 − 𝐷𝐷)|𝑍𝑍 = 1]
𝑝𝑝0|0 − 𝑝𝑝0|1 − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 0] + 𝑝𝑝0|1
𝑝𝑝0|0 − 𝑝𝑝0|1 {𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 0] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 0]}. 
Proof: See appendix.  
Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7, 
𝛿𝛿1
𝑐𝑐(1) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 1] − 𝑝𝑝1|0𝑝𝑝1|1 − 𝑝𝑝1|0 {𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 1]} 
−𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 0] + 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 0]
−
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1 − 𝐷𝐷)|𝑍𝑍 = 0] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1 − 𝐷𝐷)|𝑍𝑍 = 1]
𝑝𝑝0|0 − 𝑝𝑝0|1  
Proof: See appendix.  
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Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7, 
𝛿𝛿1
𝑐𝑐(1) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1𝐷𝐷|𝑍𝑍 = 1] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1𝐷𝐷|𝑍𝑍 = 0]
𝑝𝑝1|1 − 𝑝𝑝1|0  
−𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 0] + 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 0]
−
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1 − 𝐷𝐷)|𝑍𝑍 = 0] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1 − 𝐷𝐷)|𝑍𝑍 = 1]
𝑝𝑝0|0 − 𝑝𝑝0|1  
Proof: See appendix.  
Assumption 8: Common trends for compliers and always takers under 𝑧𝑧 = 0 and 𝑑𝑑 = 1  
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,1)|𝑎𝑎] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,1)|𝑎𝑎] = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,1)|𝑐𝑐] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,1)|𝑐𝑐] 
Our final assumption imposes a common trend restriction w.r.t. potential outcomes of the 
always takers and compliers under 𝑧𝑧 = 0 and 𝑑𝑑 = 1. Similar to the discussion of Assumption 
5, we note that when also invoking Assumption 3, Assumption 8 is satisfied if (i) 
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,0)|𝑎𝑎] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑎𝑎] = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,0)|𝑐𝑐] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑐𝑐] (common trend in mean 
potential outcomes under 𝑧𝑧 = 0  and 𝑑𝑑 = 0 ) and 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,1)|𝑎𝑎] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑎𝑎] =
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,1)|𝑐𝑐] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑐𝑐]  (mean effect of D is homogeneous across strata), or if 
(ii) 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,0)|𝑎𝑎] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑎𝑎] ≠ 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,0)|𝑐𝑐] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑐𝑐]  and 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,1)|𝑎𝑎] −
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑎𝑎] ≠ 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(0,1)|𝑐𝑐] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(0,0)|𝑐𝑐] in a very specific way that satisfies Assumption 
8. Assumption 8 therefore appears somewhat weaker than Assumption 5 when comparing case 
(i) of either assumption, as effect homogeneity is now only assumed w.r.t. D (rather than the 
joint effects of D and Z). However, Assumptions 5 and 8 are strictly speaking not nested, which 
becomes particularly obvious when comparing case (ii) of either assumption. Assumption 8 
permits identifying the direct effect under treatment (when either imposing Assumption 5 or 6) 
and the indirect effect under non-treatment among compliers.  
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Theorem 6: Direct effect under 𝑧𝑧 = 1 and indirect effect under 𝑧𝑧 = 0 on compliers  
Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 8, 
𝜃𝜃1
𝑐𝑐(1) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 1] − 𝑝𝑝1|0𝑝𝑝1|1 − 𝑝𝑝1|0 {𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 1]} 
−𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 1] + 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 1]
−
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1 − 𝐷𝐷)|𝑍𝑍 = 0] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1 − 𝐷𝐷)|𝑍𝑍 = 1]
𝑝𝑝0|0 − 𝑝𝑝0|1  
Proof: See appendix.  
Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8, 
𝜃𝜃1
𝑐𝑐(1) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1𝐷𝐷|𝑍𝑍 = 1] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1𝐷𝐷|𝑍𝑍 = 0]
𝑝𝑝1|1 − 𝑝𝑝1|0  
−𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 1] + 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 1]
−
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1 − 𝐷𝐷)|𝑍𝑍 = 0] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1 − 𝐷𝐷)|𝑍𝑍 = 1]
𝑝𝑝0|0 − 𝑝𝑝0|1  
Proof: See appendix.  
Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8, 
𝛿𝛿1
𝑐𝑐(0) = 𝑝𝑝0|1
𝑝𝑝0|0 − 𝑝𝑝0|1 {𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 1,𝐷𝐷 = 0] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 0]} − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 0] +𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0|𝑍𝑍 = 0,𝐷𝐷 = 1]
+ 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1 − 𝐷𝐷)|𝑍𝑍 = 0] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1 − 𝐷𝐷)|𝑍𝑍 = 1]
𝑝𝑝0|0 − 𝑝𝑝0|1  
Proof: See appendix.  
We have demonstrated that direct and indirect effects can be identified for various 
subpopulations under random treatment assignment and specific common trend assumptions 
that differ w.r.t. their strength. In particular, when several common trend assumptions need to 
be combined as it is the case for the compliers, identification only appears plausible if one can 
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credibly assume homogeneity in average effects across strata. Whenever the effects for all three 
strata (compliers, always takers, and never takers) are identified, so are the direct and indirect 
effects in the total population. This follows from an application of the law of total probability:  
𝜃𝜃1(𝑑𝑑) = 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝜃𝜃1𝑐𝑐(𝑑𝑑) + 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝜃𝜃1𝑎𝑎(𝑑𝑑) + 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃1𝑛𝑛(𝑑𝑑) = �𝑝𝑝1|1 − 𝑝𝑝1|0�𝜃𝜃1𝑐𝑐(𝑑𝑑) + 𝑝𝑝1|0𝜃𝜃1𝑎𝑎(𝑑𝑑) + 𝑝𝑝0|1𝜃𝜃1𝑛𝑛(𝑑𝑑) 
𝛿𝛿1(𝑑𝑑) = 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝛿𝛿1𝑐𝑐(𝑑𝑑) + 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛0 = �𝑝𝑝1|1 − 𝑝𝑝1|0�𝛿𝛿1𝑐𝑐(𝑑𝑑) 
Note that under Assumption 6, 𝜃𝜃1𝑎𝑎(𝑑𝑑) = 0  such that the expression for 𝜃𝜃1(𝑑𝑑)  further 
simplifies. 
3 Empirical application 
During the Vietnam War, the majority of American troops consisted of volunteers, while the 
rest were selected through a draft (Gimbel and Booth, 1996). Young men at age 18 had to 
register at local draft boards for classification. These boards determined medical fitness and 
initially also decided on the order in which registrants would be called. In an attempt to make 
the draft fair, a draft lottery was conducted in the years 1969 to 1972 to determine the order of 
call to military service for men born between 1944 and 1952. The lottery assigned a draft 
number to each birth date for men in certain age cohorts, where low draft numbers were called 
first upon a ceiling. 
We seek to analyse the impact of having a low random draft lottery number (i.e., being 
drafted for military service) on political preferences and attitudes, and to understand through 
which channels this effect materializes. The most obvious channel is military service, as a low 
draft number increases the likelihood to join the army. The effect of the draft number, which 
goes through military service, is the indirect effect. The possibility to get a draft exemption and 
associated behaviour may also impact political preferences and attitudes. College education, for 
example, may lead to more political participation (Dee, 2004; Milligan, Moretti, and 
Oreopoulos; Kam and Palmer, 2008; Milstein Sondheimer and Green, 2009), affect political 
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attitudes by increasing personal income (Morten, Tyran, and Wenström, 2011; Marshall, 2014), 
and leaving the country may shape preferences or opinions. We do not aim to isolate each of 
these possible channels separately, but subsume all of them into one effect which we call the 
direct effect, i.e., the effect which does not go through military service. These effects are 
interesting from a political economics perspective: If changes to public policy impact on 
individuals in direct and consequential ways, policy makers might be worried about changes in 
political preferences and electoral behaviour of such groups. A mechanism of policy 
interventions based on endogenous preferences would be in contrast to the usual 
micro-economic assumption of stable preferences such that standard economic models of 
politics would have to be reconsidered.  
In our application we focus on the draft lottery taking place on July 1, 1970, which 
determined the order in which men born in 1951 were called to report for induction into the 
military in 1971. From January to April 1971, individuals with random draft numbers between 
1 and 100 were called for induction, while for the rest of the year individuals with random draft 
numbers between 1 and 125 were called. The ceiling of 125 was first announced in October 
1971. This late announcement had the consequence that during most of the year the ultimate 
ceiling below which people were drafted was unclear. This uncertainty may have caused 
important behavioural responses: On the one hand, education deferments were continued to be 
issued until 1971, which means that men could avoid being drafted by going to or staying in 
college (Card and Lemieux, 2001).1 On the other hand, low draft numbers may have not only 
increased the risk to be drafted but also the likelihood to voluntarily join the army (Angrist, 
1991). The draft avoiding behaviour makes the use of the lottery as an instrumental variable 
doubtful (Deuchert and Huber, 2014). 
                                                 
1 Another possibility to evade the draft was to leave the country. Overall it seems that this option was not used 
extensively. For a discussion on the estimated number of evaders leaving the country, see Baskir and Strauss 
(1978), Hagan (2001), or Jones (2005). 
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Previous contributions such as Bergan (2009) and Erikson and Stoker (2011) studied the 
impact of the draft lottery on political preferences and attitudes towards the war. Bergan (2009) 
shows that a low draft lottery number increases the probability of favouring an immediate 
withdrawal from Vietnam. Erikson and Stoker (2011) analyse the lottery’s impact on young 
college bound males, which were especially vulnerable to the new draft policy. The high-school 
cohort of 1965 was the first one with a strongly increased probability of military induction due 
to the lottery and the abolishment of previous deferment options. Erikson and Stoker (2011) 
find that the effect of the lottery number on political preferences and attitudes was large. Young 
males with low draft numbers more likely voted for the democrats and had anti-war and liberal 
attitudes. The authors note that only 32% of these males actually served in the military and 
among them 74% enlisted voluntarily or preemptively. There is a difference in the rate at which 
young males with lottery numbers below and above the relevant draft cut-off enlisted. While 
39% of the cohort with low draft numbers actually served in the military, 24% served in the 
cohort above the cut-off. Moreover, Erikson and Stoker (2011) do not find any effect of the 
military service itself on political preferences and attitudes. 
These results illustrate important issues when analysing the effect of such a policy change. 
First, young males reacted in heterogeneous ways to the introduction of the draft. An important 
proportion of young males in the cohorts above as well as below the cut-off enlisted voluntarily, 
such that there are individuals that enlist independently of the actual draft risk. Due to 
heterogeneity in unobserved characteristics, the ATE could be entirely driven by some 
subpopulation, for example by those who only enlist when chosen by the lottery (compliers), or 
those who do not enlist whatever the lottery outcome (never takers). It is therefore interesting to 
distinguish the average effects of the policy intervention across these subgroups or strata. 
Second, it is important to separate direct effects of a low lottery number from indirect effects 
that stem from actually serving in the military.  
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3.1 Data 
Our data comes from the “Young Men in High School and Beyond” (YESB) survey (Bachman, 
1999), a five-wave longitudinal study among a national sample of male students who were in 
10th grade in fall 1966. Information was collected in 1966 (wave 1), spring 1968 (at the end of 
eleventh grade, wave 2), spring 1969 (wave 3), June-July 1970 (wave 4), and spring 1974 
(wave 5). In this paper we use respondents who were born in 1951 as reported in the first wave 
and who were at the time of the data collection of wave 4 in 1970 not yet in the Army. The 
dataset is particularly suited for our research question for several reasons: (1) It contains a vast 
set of variables describing political preferences and attitudes, which are available in the waves 
before and after the lottery took place. (2) It is one of the very rare publicly available datasets 
that provides the exact birth date, which is necessary to link draft lottery numbers to 
individuals.2 (3) Attrition is relatively low compared to many other longitudinal surveys – we 
observe almost 80% of the initial sample in wave 5. (4) Unlike many other surveys, the data 
also includes individuals serving in the military (if they can be located).  
Descriptive statistics for political preferences and attitudes are presented in Table 1. In order to 
illustrate our results in a compact form, we present statistics as well as estimation results on 
indices which aggregate answers on individual questions to related topics. The composite 
indices contain five questions on attitudes towards the government, six questions on attitudes 
specifically on the war in Vietnam, and three questions on government interventions for the 
equal treatment of races.3 The overall picture is not affected by the use of indices rather than 
the original variables.  
                                                 
2 Available from the Selective Service System: https://www.sss.gov/Portals/0/PDFs/1971.pdf 
3 Index components: Positive attitudes toward the government is the sum of answers to the following questions: 
“Do you think the government wastes much of the money we pay in taxes?” (little/no), “How much of the time 
do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?” (always/often), “Do you feel that 
the people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing?” (always/usually 
know what doing), “Do you think some of the people running the government are crooked or dishonest?” (hardly 
any/none), “Would you say the government is pretty much run for a few big interests looking out for themselves, 
or is it run for the benefit of all the people?” (nearly always/usually run for the benefit of all the people). Positive 
attitudes toward Vietnam War is the sum of the answers to question on “Fighting the war in Vietnam…”: “was 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Wave Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 
Strongly/mildly Republican (0-1) 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.21 0.14 
 
(0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (0.41) (0.35) 
      Strongly/mildly Democrat (0-1) 0.37 0.33 0.38 0.32 0.29 
 
(0.48) (0.47) (0.49) (0.47) (0.45) 
      Positive attitudes toward government (0-5) 2.64 2.38 2.23 1.63 0.99 
 
(1.44) (1.46) (1.34) (1.30) (1.05) 
      Positive attitudes toward Vietnam War (0-6) 
  
3.32 2.76 2.41 
   
(0.80) (2.03) (0.63) 
      Government interventions for equal  
  
2.50 2.60 2.68 
treatment of races (0-3) 
  
(0.76) (0.69) (2.04) 
    
No of observations 972 946 970 972 871 
Mean; standard deviation in parentheses 
 
The descriptive statistics display some interesting patterns. Particularly in the last wave, the 
Republicans lost dramatically in electoral support, which most likely reflects the consequence 
of the Watergate scandal, with the Republican incumbent President, Richard Nixon, at centre 
stage.4 Interestingly, the Democrats could not benefit from the scandal with higher rates of 
electoral support. Positive attitudes towards the government also declined substantially. There 
are also some changes in attitudes towards the Vietnam War, but these are less pronounced. 
A potential problem with this data arises from the fact that we do not observe the exact draft 
number for our full sample. The exact day of birth is only provided for respondents who 
participated in the fourth wave and did not serve in the military at the time of the interview, 
                                                                                                                                                        
damaging to our national honor or pride” (strongly disagree/disagree), “was really not in the national interest” 
(strongly disagree/disagree), “was important to fight the spread of Communism” (strongly agree/agree) , “brought 
us closer to world war” (strongly disagree/disagree) , “was important to protect friendly countries” (strongly 
agree/agree) , “was important to show other nations that we keep our promises” (strongly agree/agree). 
Government interventions for equal treatment of races is the sum of answers with the following questions: “The 
government in Washington should see to it that white and black children are allowed to go to the same schools if 
they want to” (agree/agree mostly), “The government in Washington should see to it that people are treated fairly 
and equally in jobs, no matter what their race may be” (agree/agree mostly), “It is not the government’s business to 
pass laws about equal treatment for all races” (disagree mostly/ disagree).  
4 The Watergate Scandal refers to the political turmoil initiated by the break-in at the Democratic Parties 
headquarters, in which the incumbent Republican administration under President Richard Nixon was involved. 
The scandal ultimately led to the resignation of Richard Nixon in 1974. 
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which restricts our estimation sample to 972 individuals (about 70% of our original sample). 
This selection, however, is unlikely to be associated with the random draft number (RDN): 
Young men born in 1951 were called to report for induction into the military in year 1971. 
Consequently, no individual of the initial sample was drafted when the interviews for the fourth 
wave took place. Moreover, most individuals were interviewed even before the lottery so that 
they were not aware of their draft number and could not have taken any steps to reduce the risk 
imposed by a small draft number (such as leaving the country). Therefore, the lottery should be 
internally valid (exogenous) for the individuals observed in 1970.  
One may worry, however, that attrition from wave 4 to 5 is associated with the draft number, 
since we lose a further 10% of our subsample (N =871). Even though individuals who still 
served in the military are included, one would expect that dropout rates are highest among those 
with a high draft risk due to death on active duty, the inability to locate individuals who are still 
on active duty or draft avoidance by leaving the country. Surprisingly, this is not the case. 
Dropout rates from wave 4 to 5 are 2 percentage points lower for individuals with lottery 
numbers below the ceiling (9% vs. 11%). Nevertheless, attrition from wave 4 to 5 may cause a 
selection bias. In Table A1 of the appendix, we provide a balancing test for pre-lottery 
outcomes for respondents with RDN below or above the ceiling and who are still observed in 
wave 5. For all outcomes considered, there are no striking differences in pre-lottery outcomes 
between individuals with high and low RDN, indicating that selection bias is unlikely an issue 
in this application. 
3.2 Average treatment effect 
In the following we estimate the effect of a low draft lottery number on political preferences and 
Vietnam War attitudes. In the first step we use the experimental estimator to evaluate the ATE. 
Table 2 presents the results, where the treatment is a binary indicator that is equal to one if the 
random draft number was below the ceiling. Individuals with low draft numbers are about 5% 
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more likely to report to vote Republican. All other results do not show significant differences 
between individuals above and below the cut-off and the estimated coefficients are always very 
small.  
These results are in stark contrast to those of Bergan (2009) and Erikson and Stoker (2011). 
Bergan (2009) reports a significantly positive effect of the lottery on the probability of 
favouring an immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. Even though our data set contains similar, 
albeit not exactly the same measures, we find no significant effect of low lottery numbers on 
Vietnam War attitudes. Erikson and Stoker (2011) use a sample of college-bound young males 
who graduated from high school in 1965 and were therefore at risk to being drafted in the 1969 
lottery since their college deferment exhausted with graduation. Those males are found to be 
more likely to report to favour Democrats over Republicans. Specifically, Erikson and Stoker 
(2011) show that individuals with low lottery numbers voted more often for McGovern 
(Democrat) relative to Nixon (Republican) or favoured Democratic over Republican attitudes 
in a rating of attitudes towards McGovern vs. Nixon, party political activities, a composite issue 
attitude index, and political ideology showing preferences for liberal relative to conservative 
positions. Moreover, individuals with low lottery numbers expressed more anti-war opinions. 
In contrast, we find insignificant differences between individuals with low and high numbers 
w.r.t. to composite indices on attitudes towards the war and the government, and the same 
applies to the specific questions of these indices (not reported). 
 
Table 2: Average treatment effects  
 
ATE 
  
Strongly/mildly Republican (0-1) 0.054 ** 
 
(0.027) 
  Strongly/mildly Democrat (0-1) 0.017 
 
(0.034) 
  Positive attitudes toward government (0-5) 0.014 
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(0.079) 
  Positive attitudes toward Vietnam War (0-6) -0.051 
 
(0.149) 
  Government interventions for equal  -0.001 
treatment of races (0-3) (0.046) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The differences of our results with respect to the study by Bergan (2009) and Erikson and 
Stoker (2011) may be explained by the sample selection process: Bergan (2009) focuses on a 
small sample of University students in1972 and tests the impact of having a low lottery number 
while they are still in college. Once these students graduate they have no further possibility to 
receive a deferment. The measured effect is thus most likely the effect of the draft risk. Erikson 
and Stoker (2011) focus on individuals whose high school curriculum was college preparatory. 
It is thus very likely that many individuals in their dataset have entered college shortly after 
completing high school in 1965 and graduated in 1969 at the time of the first draft. They were 
thus at risk to be drafted for military without the possibility to receive a further deferment, as 
deferments for graduate studies were eliminated already in 1967. In our sample, in contrast, 
individuals could still receive a deferment (which continued to be issued until 1971). Therefore, 
in the sample of Erikson and Stoker individuals were forced to be compliers, while in our 
sample, individuals could choose to be a complier – at least to some extent. For this reason, 
effect heterogeneities across strata may be important. In the following we distinguish between 
different strata and estimate direct and indirect effects of the draft lottery.  
3.3 Strata proportions and description 
In the first stage, we estimate the impact of a RDN below the ceiling on veteran status (as 
reported in 1971) and describe the different strata w.r.t. their political preferences and attitudes 
– measured before the lottery took place. As is shown in Table 3, the lottery shifted the 
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likelihood of military service by more than 20 percentage points, which corresponds to the 
share of compliers. This seems relatively small at first glance but can be explained by the fact 
that a high share of our sample held a college deferment even before the lottery took place. 
About 4% of the population voluntarily joined the army even though they were not obliged to 
(always takers). Note that this does not correspond to the share of individuals who voluntarily 
joined the army for two reasons: First, people who voluntarily enlisted before the lottery took 
place are not included in our sample since we cannot match the random draft number with the 
birth date. Second, a bad lottery outcome may have induced some men to enlist “voluntarily” 
(Angrist, 1991). Since our mediator of interest is military service – no matter if individuals 
joined voluntarily or were drafted – these induced “voluntary” enlistments are considered as 
compliers. The vast majority of the population are never takers (73%) who avoided the draft 
even with a RDN below the ceiling of 126 – either because they were ineligible or because they 
already had or applied for a deferment. 
Table 3: First stage results 
 b/se 
RDN < 126 0.224*** 
 (0.022) 
Constant 0.044*** 
 (0.013) 
R2 0.107 
N 848 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** 
p < 0.001 
Table 4: Mean differences across strata (pre-treatment characteristics) 
  
C vs. AT 
(T=0) 
C vs. NT 
(T=0) 
      
Wave 3: Military knowledge test (0-40) 0.862 1.143 
 
(1.31) (1.519) 
   Wave 1: IQ Test -6.254** -8.794** 
 
(3.548) (3.761) 
   Wave 1: Self perceived intelligence  0.223** 0.497 
(1: top 10% to 6: bottom 10%) (0.207) (0.305) 
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Wave 1: Has college plans -0.064 -0.345** 
 
(0.139) (0.157) 
   
Military classification (Wave 4) 
     
Student deferment -0.072 -0.386** 
 
(0.14) (0.171) 
   Available for military 0.140** 0.461*** 
 
(0.137) (0.142) 
   Not classified -0.004 0.019 
 
(0.057) (0.066) 
   Other -0.064 -0.094 
 
(0.105) (0.122) 
      
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 4 displays strata differences in pre-treatment characteristics that are estimated based 
on equations (A5) and (A16) in the appendix. While the different groups do not seem to differ 
in their knowledge about military life, compliers (C) had significantly lower academic skills 
measured in terms of an IQ-test or self-perceived intelligence than always and never takers 
(AT, NT). Compliers were also significantly less likely than never takers to have college plans 
or to hold a student deferment shortly before or at the draft lottery, and more likely available for 
the military. 
Even though the groups differ with respect to academic skills and college aspiration, Table 5 
shows that the strata (C: compliers; AT: always takers; NT: never takers) are relatively similar 
in terms of pre-treatment political preferences prior to the lottery.  
 
Table 5: Mean differences across strata (pre-treatment outcomes, wave 4)  
 
C vs. AT 
(T=0) 
C vs. NT 
(T=0) 
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Strongly/mildly Republican (0-1)  0.080   -0.004  
 
(0.115) (0.147) 
 
    
Strongly/mildly Democrat (0-1)  0.096   -0.004  
 
(0.116) (0.164) 
 
    
Positive attitudes toward government (0-5)  0.000   0.259  
 
(0.355) (0.461) 
 
    
Positive attitudes toward Vietnam War (0-6)  -0.319   0.060  
 
(0.586) (0.708) 
 
    
Government interventions for equal   -0.176   0.130  
treatment of races (0-3) (0.158) (0.254) 
   
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
3.4 Decomposition of the average treatment effect 
In the following we decompose the ATEs displayed in Table 2 into strata-specific direct and 
indirect effects to understand which channels drive the overall findings. As the credibility of the 
results of the decomposition hinges on the plausibility of Assumptions (1 to 8), we discuss the 
latter in the light of our application in the next section.  
3.4.1 Plausibility of the identifying assumptions 
Assumption 1 implies that there are no confounders jointly affecting the lottery outcome on the 
one hand and military service and/or the outcome variables on the other hand. This assumption 
seems uncontroversial since the draft number was randomized and unlike the first lottery that 
had taken place in 1969, the randomization was well executed (Fienberg, 1971). Also balancing 
tests with respect to pre-treatment outcomes measured in wave 4 (Table A1) support this 
assumption. Assumption 2 rules out the existence of defiers, which seems plausible in the 
context of the draft lottery. It appears hard to argue why an individual should avoid the draft 
when being chosen by the lottery, but voluntarily join the army when not being chosen. 
Assumption 3 rules out anticipation effects of the treatment or the mediator w.r.t. to the 
outcome in the baseline period. Given the fact that the results of the lottery could not have been 
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foreseen and that the large majority of interviews took place before the lottery, this assumption 
is also likely satisfied and supported by the results of the balancing test with respect to 
outcomes measured in wave 4. 
Assumption 4 imposes common trends for compliers and never takers when receiving a high 
lottery number and not joining the army. This is a fairly standard restriction in the DiD 
literature, arguing that the mean outcomes of various groups develop in a comparable way if no 
one receives any treatment. The fact that compliers and never taker had fairly similar outcomes 
prior the lottery (see Table 5) somewhat supports this assumption, albeit similarity in levels is 
strictly speaking neither necessary nor sufficient for common trends. Assumption 1 to 4 are 
sufficient to estimate the direct effect on the never takers. We perform placebo estimations by 
using wave 4 as the placebo follow up period and wave 3 as baseline period (Table A2). The 
placebo effects for the direct effect on the never takers are small and insignificant for all 
outcomes and therefore support our strategy. 
Assumption 5 would be satisfied if the joint average effect of the lottery and military service 
was comparable across individuals voluntarily joining the army (always takers) or being 
induced to join (compliers), which seems to be a very strong assumption. Alternatively, one 
may assume a zero direct effect on always takers (Assumption 6). This seems more credible in 
our current setting: Always takers are not forced to change their behavior because they would 
join the army anyway such that a low lottery number per se should have no direct effect on 
political preferences. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, we can consistently estimate the total 
treatment effect on the compliers. We also perform placebo estimations of the total treatment 
effect on compliers (Table A2). Results are small and insignificant. 
Assumption 7 imposes common trends for compliers and never takers when both groups 
receive low lottery numbers but neither group actually joins the army. This means that 
outcomes of compliers and never takers would develop in a similar way if one could induce 
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compliers to react to the lottery in a similar way as never takers. Combined with previous 
assumptions this implies that the direct effects of the lottery when neither group joins the army 
are homogeneous. Assumption 8, in contrast, assumes common trends for compliers and 
always takers when both groups receive high lottery numbers but join the army anyway. Note 
that Assumptions 7 and 8 (in combination with other assumptions) identify different indirect 
effects: Assumption 7 gives the effect of joining the army among compliers when having a low 
random number (𝑧𝑧 = 1). Assumption 8, in contrast, identifies the effect of joining the army 
when compliers receive a high random number (𝑧𝑧 = 0). This seems to be a hypothetical effect 
since compliers do not join the army if they are not induced to by the lottery. We therefore 
impose Assumption 7 in our analysis and also consider placebo estimations (Table A2) that 
yield small and insignificant results. Note that in the absence of any direct effect of the lottery, 
the indirect effects under Assumptions 7 and 8 are identical and correspond to the LATE.  
3.4.2 Direct effects on never takers 
We use the results of Theorem 1 (Assumptions 1 to 4) to estimate the direct effects of the lottery 
on the never takers, who may have taken active steps to avoid the draft as using college 
deferments (Card and Lemieux 2001). College education might in turn have affected political 
preferences and attitudes. As a consequence, there may be important direct effects (i.e., all 
effects that do not go through military service). The reported standard errors are (in contrast to 
the previous tables) not obtained based on asymptotic approximations, but by 1999 bootstrap 
replications and take account of clustering on the individual level across time periods. The 
direct effects on preferences for the Republican and Democratic Parties are both positive and 
with 3.8 and 3.5 percentage points, respectively, similar in size, but statistically not significant. 
All other estimates are small and insignificant.  
 
Table 6: Direct effect on never takers (NT) 
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Direct effect 
on NT 
  
Strongly/mildly Republican (0-1)  0.038  
 
(0.030) 
 
 
Strongly/mildly Democrat (0-1)  0.035  
 
(0.042) 
 
 
Positive attitudes toward government (0-5)  0.004  
 
(0.113) 
 
 
Positive attitudes toward Vietnam War (0-6)  -0.190  
 
(0.158) 
 
 
Government interventions for equal   0.067  
treatment of races (0-3) (0.071) 
  
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
3.4.3 Total treatment effect, direct and indirect effect on complier 
Table 7 reports the estimated total treatment effects on the compliers based on Theorem 4 
(Assumptions 1 to 4, and 6), as well as the direct and indirect effects based on Theorem 5 
(Assumptions 1 to 4, 6, and 7) along with clustered bootstrap standard errors. Note that as a 
result of our identifying assumptions, the direct effect on the compliers is equivalent to the 
direct effect on the never takers. In the last column we also present the two stage least squares 
estimate for the LATE (using analytical standard errors). In contrast to our framework, the 
LATE framework assumes that the draft lottery is a valid instrument, which implies that all 
direct effects are zero.  
 
Table 7: Total, direct and indirect effect on compliers (C) 
 
Total effect  
on C 
Direct effect 
on C 
Indirect effect 
on C 
Indirect effect  
using LATE 
     
Strongly/mildly Republican (0-1) 0.113  0.038   0.075  0.239** 
 
(0.133) (0.030) (0.150) (0.114) 
 
    
Strongly/mildly Democrat (0-1) -0.041  0.035   -0.076  0.074 
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(0.148) (0.042) (0.169) (0.149) 
 
    
Positive attitudes toward  0.050  0.004   0.045  0.063 
government (0-5) (0.401) (0.113) (0.474) (0.34) 
 
    
Positive attitudes toward Vietnam  0.392  -0.190   0.582  -0.228 
War (0-6) (0.658) (0.158) (0.729) (0.665) 
 
    
Government interventions for 
equal  -0.221  0.067   -0.288  
-0.003 
treatment of races (0-3) (0.218) (0.071) (0.265) (0.2) 
     
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Neither the total effects nor the decomposed direct and indirect effects reach conventional 
levels of statistical significance. Nevertheless, a few interesting patterns emerge if we take the 
estimates at face value. The total effects on compliers’ party preferences, characterized by an 
increase in the support for the Republican Party and a decrease in the support for the 
Democrats, appears to be mainly driven by the indirect effect of the draft lottery which goes 
through military service. However, both the total and the indirect effects on compliers are far 
smaller than the LATE estimate, which suggests that military service increases support for the 
Republican Party by 24 percentage points and is significant at the 5% level. This points to the 
non-robustness of the results across various econometric approaches, as the true LATE equals 
the true indirect effect among compliers in the absence of direct effects. We therefore argue that 
previous studies that use the lottery as instrument for military service should be interpreted with 
caution.  
4 Conclusion 
We propose a difference-in-differences approach to disentangle the total causal effect of a 
policy intervention into a direct effect and an indirect effect operating through a binary 
intermediate variable (or mediator) within subpopulations (or strata). The strata are defined 
upon how the mediator reacts to the treatment. We show under which assumptions the direct 
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effects on the always and never takers (whose mediator is not affected by the treatment) as well 
as the direct and indirect effects on the compliers (whose mediator reacts to the treatment) are 
identified.  
We apply our method to investigate the effect of the Vietnam draft lottery between 1969 and 
1972 in the US on political preferences as well as personal views on the government and war 
policies. Our mediator of interest is military service during the Vietnam War. A subgroup of 
individuals (compliers) was induced by the lottery to serve in the army, while others avoided 
the draft (never takers) or would have served in any case (always takers). In a first step, we 
estimate the average treatment effect in the total population and find a roughly 5 percentage 
points higher probability of voting for the Republican Party (and insignificant effects on other 
outcomes). In a second step, we estimate the direct and indirect effects of the draft lottery 
within subgroups. In general, we do not find statistically significant effects, even though several 
of the total and indirect effects on the compliers are sizeable in magnitude, which suggests that 
the compliers drive the overall results. It therefore seems that if anything, compliers serving in 
Vietnam are less affected by the overall decline in Republican support supposedly due to the 
unravelling of the Watergate Scandal. At the same time, both the total and indirect estimates of 
voting for the Republican Party among compliers are considerably smaller than the two stage 
least squares estimate, which uses the lottery as an instrument for military service. This 
non-robustness of results across methods casts doubts on the instrument validity of the draft 
lottery and in particular the satisfaction of the exclusion restriction that has been frequently 
imposed in the literature.  
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Appendix  
Proof of Theorem 1: 
We denote by Pr( )pτ τ=  the share of a particular type in the population and by 
| Pr( | )d zp D d Z z= = =  the conditional probability of a particular treatment state given the 
instrument, with d,z in {1,0}. By Assumption 1, the share of a type conditional on Z corresponds 
to pτ  (in the population), as Z is randomly assigned. Likewise, 
[ ] [ ] [ ]( , ) | , 1 ( , ) | , 0 ( , ) |t t tE Y z d Z E Y z d Z E Y z dτ τ τ= = = =  due to the independence of Z and 
the potential outcomes as well as the types (which are a deterministic function of D(z)). It 
follows that conditioning on Z is not required on the right hand side of the following equation, 
which expresses the mean outcome given Z=0 and D=0 as weighted average of the mean 
potential outcomes of compliers and never takers, the two types satisfying D(0)=0 and thus 
making up the group with Z=0 and D=0:   
 [ ] [ ]( | 0, 0) (0,0) | (0,0) | .n ct t t
n c n c
p pE Y Z D E Y n E Y c
p p p p
= = = +
+ +
  (A1) 
After some rearrangements we obtain 
[ ] [ ] [ ]{ }(0,0) | (0,0) | (0,0) | ( | 0, 0) .n ct t t t
c
p pE Y n E Y c E Y n E Y Z D
p
+
− = − = =  
(A2) 
Next, consider observations with Z=1 and D=0 who might consist of both never takers 
and defiers, as D(1)=0 for both types. However, by Assumption 2, defiers are ruled out, such 
that the mean outcome given Z=1 and D=0 is determined by never takers only: 
[ ]( | 1, 0) (1,0) |t tE Y Z D E Y n= = = .        
(A3) 
Furthermore, by Assumption 3,  
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[ ] [ ]0 0 0(0,0) | (1,0) | ( | 1, 0)E Y n E Y n E Y Z D= = = = .      
(A4)  
It follows that when considering (A2) in period T=0, [ ]0(0,0) |E Y n  on the right hand side of 
the equation may be replaced by 0( | 1, 0)E Y Z D= = : 
[ ] [ ] { }0 0 0 0(0,0) | (0,0) | ( | 1, 0) ( | 0, 0) .n c
c
p pE Y n E Y c E Y Z D E Y Z D
p
+
− = = = − = =  
(A5)  
Let us now consider (A1) in period T=1: 
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]{ }
[ ] [ ] [ ]{ }
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
( | 0, 0) (0,0) | (0,0) |
( | 0, 0) (0,0) | (0,0) | (0,0) |
(0,0) | ( | 0, 0) (0,0) | (0,0) | .
n c
n c n c
c
n c
c
n c
p pE Y Z D E Y n E Y c
p p p p
pE Y Z D E Y n E Y n E Y c
p p
pE Y n E Y Z D E Y n E Y c
p p
= = = +
+ +
⇔ = = = − −
+
⇔ = = = + −
+
 (A6) 
By Assumption 4, we may replace [ ] [ ]1 1(0,0) | (0,0) |E Y n E Y c−  in (A6) by the right hand side 
of (A5), which gives  
[ ]1 1 0 0(0,0) | ( | 0, 0) ( | 1, 0) ( | 0, 0).E Y n E Y Z D E Y Z D E Y Z D= = = + = = − = =
 (A7) 
Finally, using (A3) in period T=1 and subtracting (A7) yields the identification result based on 
differences in differences:  
[ ] [ ]
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
1 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
(1,0) | (0,0) |
( | 1, 0) ( | 0, 0) ( | 1, 0) ( | 0, 0)
( | 1, 0) ( | 1, 0) ( | 0, 0) ( | 0, 0) .
n E Y n E Y n
E Y Z D E Y Z D E Y Z D E Y Z D
E Y Z D E Y Z D E Y Z D E Y Z D
θ = −
= = = − = = + = = − = =
= = = − = = − = = − = =
 
(A8) 
Testable implication of Assumptions 1 to 3: 
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We consider (A1) for period T=0 and replace [ ]0(0,0) |E Y n  by 0( | 1, 0)E Y Z D= =  as 
suggested in (A4): 
[ ]0 0 0( | 0, 0) ( | 1, 0) (0,0) | .n c
n c n c
p pE Y Z D E Y Z D E Y c
p p p p
= = = = = +
+ +
  
 (A9) 
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, 0|0n cp p p+ = , 0|1np p=  and 0|0 0|1cp p p= − , which corresponds 
to the (first stage) effect of Z on D. Therefore, [ ]0(0,0) |E Y c  is identified when plugging the 
latter probabilities into (A9): 
[ ]
[ ]
0|1 0|0 0|1
0 0 0
0|0 0|0
0|0 0|1
0 0 0
0|0 0|1 0|0 0|1
0 0
0|0 0|1
( | 0, 0) ( | 1, 0) (0,0) |
(0,0) | ( | 0, 0) ( | 1, 0)
( (1 ) | 0) ( (1 ) | 1) .
p p p
E Y Z D E Y Z D E Y c
p p
p p
E Y c E Y Z D E Y Z D
p p p p
E Y D Z E Y D Z
p p
−
= = = = = +
⇔ = = = − = =
− −
− = − − =
=
−
 (A10) 
Similarly to (A1) for the never takers and compliers, consider the mean outcome given Z=1 and 
D=1, which is made up by always takers and compliers (the types with D(1)=1) 
[ ] [ ]( | 1, 1) (1,1) | (1,1) | .a ct t t
a c a c
p pE Y Z D E Y a E Y c
p p p p
= = = +
+ +
 
 (A11) 
In analogy to (A10), one can show that under Assumptions 1 to 3, 
[ ] 0 00
1|1 1|0
( | 1) ( | 0)(1,1) | .E Y D Z E Y D ZE Y c
p p
= − =
=
−
   
 (A12) 
Under the validity of Assumptions 1 to 3, (A10) and (A12) must be identical. It is easy to show 
(based on counter-probabilities) that the denominator on the right hand side of (A12), 1|1 1|0p p−
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, is equal to that in the last line in (A10), 0|0 0|1p p− . It therefore also follows that the respective 
denominators must be equal under Assumptions 1 to 3, which implies:  
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0
( | 1) ( | 0) ( (1 ) | 0) ( (1 ) | 1)
( | 1) ( (1 ) | 1) ( | 0) ( (1 ) | 0) 0
( | 1) ( | 0) 0
E Y D Z E Y D Z E Y D Z E Y D Z
E Y D Z E Y D Z E Y D Z E Y D Z
E Y Z E Y Z
= − = = − = − − =
⇔ = + − = − = − − = =
⇔ = − = =
 (A13) 
Identification of direct effect on always takers 
From rearranging (A11) follows that 
[ ] [ ] [ ]{ }(1,1) | (1,1) | (1,1) | ( | 1, 1) .a ct t t t
c
p pE Y a E Y c E Y a E Y Z D
p
+
− = − = =   
 (A14) 
By Assumptions 1 and 2,  
[ ]0 0(0,1) | ( | 0, 1)E Y a E Y Z D= = = .     
 (A15)  
Now consider (A14) for period T=0, and note that by Assumption 3, 
[ ] [ ] [ ]0 0 0(1,1) | (0,0) | (0,1) |E Y a E Y a E Y a= =  (and [ ] [ ]0 0(1,1) | (0,0) |E Y c E Y c= ), such that 
we may plug the right hand side of (A15) into (A14) to obtain 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
{ }
0 0 0 0
0 0
(0,0) | (0,0) | (0,1) | (1,1) |
( | 0, 1) ( | 1, 1) .a c
c
E Y a E Y c E Y a E Y c
p p E Y Z D E Y Z D
p
− = −
+
= = = − = =
   
 (A16) 
Considering (A11) for period T=1 and performing some rearrangements yields 
[ ] [ ] [ ]{ }1 1 1 1(1,1) | ( | 1, 1) (1,1) | (1,1) | .c
a c
pE Y a E Y Z D E Y a E Y c
p p
= = = + −
+
 
 (A17) 
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By Assumption 5, [ ] [ ]1 1(1,1) | (1,1) |E Y a E Y c−  in (A17) may be replaced by the right hand 
side of (A16) which gives 
[ ]1 1 0 0(1,1) | ( | 1, 1) ( | 0, 1) ( | 1, 1)E Y a E Y Z D E Y Z D E Y Z D= = = + = = − = =
 (A18) 
Finally, acknowledging that [ ]1 1(0,1) | ( | 0, 1)E Y a E Y Z D= = = by Assumptions 1 and 2 and 
subtracting (A18) yields the identification result based on differences in differences:  
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
1 1 1
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
(1,1) | (0,1) |
( | 1, 1) ( | 0, 1) ( | 1, 1) ( | 0, 1)
( | 1, 1) ( | 1, 1) ( | 0, 1) ( | 0, 1) .
a E Y a E Y a
E Y Z D E Y Z D E Y Z D E Y Z D
E Y Z D E Y Z D E Y Z D E Y Z D
θ = −
= = = + = = − = = − = =
= = = − = = − = = − = =
 
(A19) 
Identification of ATE on compliers under Assumptions 1 to 5:  
Using Assumptions 1 to 4, we plug in the expression on the right hand side of (A7), which 
identifies [ ]1(0,0) |E Y n , into (A1) for period T=1, which allows identifying [ ]1(0,0) |E Y c  
(when also using Pr( 0 | 0)n cp p D Z+ = = =  and Pr( 0 | 1)np D Z= = = ): 
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
0|1
1 1 0 0
0|0
0|0 0|1
1
0|0
0|1
1 1 0 0
0|0 0|1
( | 0, 0) ( | 0, 0) ( | 1, 0) ( | 0, 0)
(0,0) |
(0,0) | ( | 0, 0) ( | 1, 0) ( | 0, 0) .
p
E Y Z D E Y Z D E Y Z D E Y Z D
p
p p
E Y c
p
p
E Y c E Y Z D E Y Z D E Y Z D
p p
= = = = = + = = − = =
−
+
⇔ = = = − = = − = =
−
           
 (A19) 
Using Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 5, we plug in the expression on the right hand side of (A18), 
which identifies [ ]1(1,1) |E Y a , into (A11) for period T=1, which allows identifying 
[ ]1(1,1) |E Y c  (when also using Pr( 1 | 1)a cp p D Z+ = = =  and Pr( 1 | 0)ap D Z= = = ): 
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[ ]
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
1|0
1 1 0 0
1|1
1|1 1|0
1
1|1
1|0
1 1 0 0
1|1 1|0
( | 1, 1) ( | 1, 1) ( | 0, 1) ( | 1, 1)
(1,1) |
(1,1) | ( | 1, 1) ( | 0, 1) ( | 1, 1) .
p
E Y Z D E Y Z D E Y Z D E Y Z D
p
p p
E Y c
p
p
E Y c E Y Z D E Y Z D E Y Z D
p p
= = = = = + = = − = =
−
+
⇔ = = = − = = − = =
−
           
 (A20) 
Subtracting (A19) from (A20) yields 1
c∆ .  
Identification of ATE on compliers under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6:  
Note that the identification result for [ ]1(0,0) |E Y c  given in (A19) based on Assumptions 1 to 
4 remains unchanged. Concerning [ ]1(1,1) |E Y c , reconsider (A11) for period T=1 and note that 
under Assumptions 1, 2, and 6, [ ] [ ]1 1(1,1) | (0,1) | ( | 0, 1)E Y a E Y a E Y Z D= = = = , which 
suffices for identification:  
[ ]
[ ]
1|0 1|1 1|0
1 1
1|1 1|1
1 1
1
1|1 1|0
( | 1, 1) ( | 0, 1) (1,1) |
( | 1) ( | 0)(1,1) | .
p p p
E Y Z D E Y Z D E Y c
p p
E Y D Z E Y D ZE Y c
p p
−
= = = = = +
= − =
⇔ =
−
   
         (A21) 
Subtracting (A19) from (A21) yields 1
c∆ .  
Identification of [ ] [ ]1 1 1(0) (1,0) | (0,0) |c E Y c E Y cθ = −  under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 and 
[ ] [ ]1 1 1(1) (1,1) | (1,0) |c E Y c E Y cδ = −  under Assumptions 1 ,2, 3, 5, and 7 or Assumptions 1, 2, 
3, 6, and 7, respectively:  
Note that similarly as in (A4) for the never takes, under Assumptions 1 to 3 it holds for the 
compliers that 
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[ ] [ ] 0 00 0
0|0 0|1
( (1 ) | 0) ( (1 ) | 1)(1,0) | (0,0) | ,E Y D Z E Y D ZE Y c E Y c
p p
− = − − =
= =
−
 
where the second equality follows from (A10). Considering Assumption 7, it therefore follows 
that  
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
1 0 1 0
0 0
1 0 1
0|0 0|1
0 0
1 1 0
0|0 0|1
(1,0) | (1,0) | (1,0) | (1,0) |
( (1 ) | 0) ( (1 ) | 1)( | 1, 0) ( | 1, 0) (1,0) |
( (1 ) | 0) ( (1 ) | 1)(1,0) | ( | 1, 0) ( | 1, 0) ,
E Y n E Y n E Y c E Y c
E Y D Z E Y D ZE Y Z D E Y Z D E Y c
p p
E Y D Z E Y D ZE Y c E Y Z D E Y Z D
p p
− = − =
− = − − =
= = − = = = −
−
− = − − =
⇔ = = = − = = +
−
           
 (A22) 
where we also made use of [ ](1,0) | ( | 1, 0)t tE Y n E Y Z D= = = . It follows that 1 (0)cθ  is 
identified as the difference of (A22) and (A19) under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7. 
Furthermore, 1 (1)
cδ  is identified as the difference of (A20) and (A22) under Assumptions 1, 2, 
3, 5, and 7. Finally, 1 (1)
cδ  is identified as the difference of (A21) and (A22) under 
Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7. 
Identification of [ ] [ ]1 1 1(0) (0,1) | (0,0) |c E Y c E Y cδ = −  under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8 and 
[ ] [ ]1 1 1(1) (1,1) | (0,1) |c E Y c E Y cθ = −  under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 8 or Assumptions 1, 2, 
3, 6, and 8, respectively:  
Under Assumptions 1 to 3 it holds for the compliers that 
[ ] [ ] 0 00 0
0|0 0|1
( (1 ) | 0) ( (1 ) | 1)(0,1) | (0,0) | ,E Y D Z E Y D ZE Y c E Y c
p p
− = − − =
= =
−
 
where the second equality follows from (A10). Considering Assumption 8, it therefore follows 
that  
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[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
1 0 1 0
0 0
1 0 1
0|0 0|1
0 0
1 1 0
0|0 0|1
(0,1) | (0,1) | (0,1) | (0,1) |
( (1 ) | 0) ( (1 ) | 1)( | 0, 1) ( | 0, 1) (0,1) |
( (1 ) | 0) ( (1 ) | 1)(0,1) | ( | 0, 1) ( | 0, 1) ,
E Y a E Y a E Y c E Y c
E Y D Z E Y D ZE Y Z D E Y Z D E Y c
p p
E Y D Z E Y D ZE Y c E Y Z D E Y Z D
p p
− = − =
− = − − =
= = − = = = −
−
− = − − =
⇔ = = = − = = +
−
           
 (A23) 
where we also made use of [ ](0,1) | ( | 0, 1)t tE Y a E Y Z D= = = . It follows that 1 (0)cδ  is 
identified as the difference of (A23) and (A19) under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8. 
Furthermore, 1 (1)
cθ  is identified as the difference of (A20) and (A23) under Assumptions 1, 2, 
3, 5, and 8. Finally, 1 (1)
cθ  is identified as the difference of (A21) and (A23) under 
Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8.  
 
Table A1: Balancing test (testing assumption 1 and 3) 
 
Difference 
  
Strongly/mildly Republican (0-1) 0.016 
 
(0.031) 
 
 
Strongly/mildly Democrat (0-1) -0.006 
 
(0.033) 
 
 
Positive attitudes toward government (0-5) -0.028 
 
(0.096) 
 
 
Positive attitudes toward Vietnam War (0-6) 0.080 
 
(0.149) 
 
 
Government interventions for equal  -0.034 
treatment of races (0-3) (0.051) 
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Table A2: Placebo results (wave 4= placebo treatment period, wave 3= pre-treatment period) 
  
ATE 
Never taker Always taker Complier 
 
Direct Effect Total effect Direct Effect Indirect Effect 
  
      Strongly/mildly Republican (0-1) 0.016 0.003 0.173 0.024 0.003 0.021 
 
(0.031) (0.033) (0.117) (0.15) (0.033) (0.165) 
       Strongly/mildly Democrat (0-1) -0.006 0.019 0.04 -0.097 0.019 -0.115 
 
(0.035) (0.04) (0.083) (0.154) (0.04) (0.174) 
       Positive attitudes toward government (0-5) -0.028 -0.105 -0.093 0.24 -0.106 0.346 
 
(0.1) (0.108) (0.278) (0.442) (0.108) (0.494) 
       Positive attitudes toward Vietnam War 
(0-6) 0.08 -0.045 -0.107 0.528 -0.046 0.574 
 
(0.152) (0.146) (0.422) (0.623) (0.146) (0.679) 
       Government interventions for equal  -0.034 -0.09 0.093 0.124 -0.09 0.214 
treatment of races (0-3) (0.049) (0.066) (0.133) (0.234) (0.066) (0.274) 
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Simulation study 
To illustrate our identification results and provide some intuition for scenarios in which the 
various assumptions are satisfied or violated, this section presents a brief simulation study based on 
the following data generating process (DPG): 
𝑈𝑈 ∽ 𝑁𝑁(−0.5,1), 
 𝑉𝑉, 𝜀𝜀0, 𝜀𝜀1 ∽ 𝑁𝑁(0,1), independent of each other and U, 
𝑍𝑍 ∽ 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏(0.5), independent of 𝑈𝑈,𝑉𝑉, 𝜀𝜀0, 𝜀𝜀1, 
𝐷𝐷 = 𝐼𝐼{𝑍𝑍 + 𝑈𝑈 + 𝑉𝑉 > 0}, 
𝑐𝑐 = 𝐼𝐼{𝑈𝑈 + 𝑉𝑉 ≤ 0 < 1 + 𝑈𝑈 + 𝑉𝑉}, 
𝑎𝑎 = 𝐼𝐼{𝑈𝑈 + 𝑉𝑉 > 0}, 
𝑛𝑛 = 𝐼𝐼{1 + 𝑈𝑈 + 𝑉𝑉 ≤ 0}, 
𝑌𝑌0 = 𝛼𝛼 𝐼𝐼{𝑇𝑇 = 𝑛𝑛} − 𝑈𝑈 + 𝜀𝜀0, 
𝑌𝑌1 = 𝛽𝛽𝑍𝑍 𝐼𝐼{𝑇𝑇 = 𝑐𝑐} + 𝛾𝛾𝑍𝑍 𝐼𝐼{𝑇𝑇 = 𝑎𝑎} + 𝐷𝐷 − 𝑈𝑈 + 𝜀𝜀1. 
Note that 𝐼𝐼{𝑏𝑏} denotes the indicator function which is equal to one if argument 𝑏𝑏 is satisfied 
and zero otherwise. 𝑈𝑈 is a fixed effect that jointly influences the mediator status 𝐷𝐷 and the 
outcomes 𝑌𝑌0 and 𝑌𝑌1 in periods 0 and 1, respectively, and is therefore a confounder. 𝑍𝑍 is the 
treatment, which is randomly assigned and satisfies Assumption 1. 𝑍𝑍 affects 𝐷𝐷 monotonically as 
required in Assumption 2 and may, depending 𝛽𝛽  and 𝛾𝛾 , also affect 𝑌𝑌1 . 𝑉𝑉  is a randomly 
distributed unobservable affecting the mediator. Note that the stratum definitions in terms of 
compliance behaviour follow deterministically from the mediator model and are given by the 
mutually exclusive conditions in the indicator functions for 𝑐𝑐 , 𝑎𝑎 , and 𝑛𝑛 . 𝜀𝜀0 , 𝜀𝜀1  are random 
unobservables affecting 𝑌𝑌0  and 𝑌𝑌1 , respectively. The coefficients 𝛼𝛼 , 𝛽𝛽  and 𝛾𝛾  determine the 
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outcomes and/or effects for specific strata as well as which of our identifying assumptions are (not) 
satisfied.  
We investigate the finite sample performance of estimation based on the sample analogues of 
our Theorems 1 to 6 as well as naïve OLS regression of 𝑌𝑌1 on a constant, 𝑍𝑍, and 𝐷𝐷. We run 1000 
simulations with different values for 𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽 and 𝛾𝛾 and report the bias, standard deviation (SD) and 
root mean squared error (RMSE) of each method for two sample sizes, namely 500 and 2000 
observations. Concerning the naïve OLS estimator, which, in contrast to estimation based on 
Theorems 1 to 6, does not target a specific stratum, the bias of the direct effect is computed based 
on the difference of the coefficient on 𝑍𝑍 and the true direct effect on the compliers. The bias of the 
indirect effect comes from the difference of the coefficient on 𝑍𝑍 and the true indirect effect on the 
compliers. Note that the latter equals the true effect of 𝑍𝑍  among compliers because  𝑍𝑍 
deterministically follows 𝐷𝐷.  
Table A3 provides the results for 𝛼𝛼 = 𝛽𝛽 = 𝛾𝛾 = 0 such that 𝑍𝑍 does not have any direct effect 
on 𝑌𝑌1, i.e., other than through 𝐷𝐷. It is easy to see that in this case, Assumptions 1 to 8 are satisfied 
under our DGP. In particular, the homogeneous effects of (i) 𝑍𝑍 given 𝐷𝐷 and (ii) D imply the 
satisfaction of Assumption 5, while 𝛾𝛾 = 0  satisfies Assumption 6. Furthermore, 𝛼𝛼 = 𝛽𝛽 = 0 
fulfills Assumption 7, while Assumption 8 is satisfied by the homogeneous effect of 𝐷𝐷 across all 
strata and the fact that there are no stratum-specific constant terms for compliers or always takers in 
our model. The estimators based on Theorems 1 to 6 are therefore all (close to being) unbiased. In 
contrast, the OLS estimators of the direct and indirect effects are inconsistent due to the omission 
of the confounder 𝑈𝑈. 
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Table A3: Simulations with 𝛼𝛼 = 𝛽𝛽 = 𝛾𝛾 = 0 
  500 observations 
 
2000 observations 
  bias SD RMSE 
 
bias SD RMSE 
Direct effect never takers (Ass. 1-4) -0.01 0.19 0.19 
 
0.00 0.10 0.10 
Direct effect always takers (Ass. 1-3, 5) -0.00 0.18 0.18 
 
-0.00 0.09 0.09 
Total effect compliers (Ass. 1-5) 0.02 0.47 0.47 
 
0.01 0.21 0.21 
Total effect compliers (Ass. 1-4, 6) 0.01 0.46 0.46 
 
0.01 0.22 0.23 
Direct effect compliers under D=1  
(Ass. 1-3,5,8) 0.02 0.12 0.12  
0.01 0.06 0.06 
Direct effect compliers under D=1  
(Ass. 1-3,6,8) 0.02 0.11 0.12  
0.00 0.06 0.06 
Direct effect compliers under D=0  
(Ass. 1-4,7) -0.01 0.19 0.19  
0.00 0.10 0.10 
Indirect effect compliers under D=1  
(Ass. 1-3,5,7) 0.02 0.18 0.18  
0.01 0.09 0.09 
Indirect effect compliers under D=1  
(Ass. 1-3,6,7) 0.02 0.47 0.47  
0.01 0.21 0.21 
Indirect effect compliers under D=0 
(Ass. 1-4,8) -0.01 0.46 0.46  
0.00 0.22 0.22 
OLS direct effect 0.31 0.12 0.33 
 
0.32 0.06 0.32 
OLS indirect effect -1.15 0.11 1.16 
 
-1.15 0.06 1.15 
Note: SD denotes the standard deviation, RMSE the root mean squared error of the respective estimator. 
 
Table A4 gives the results for 𝛼𝛼 = 0, 𝛽𝛽 = 𝛾𝛾 = 1 such that the effects of 𝑍𝑍 and 𝐷𝐷 are again 
homogeneous across strata. Assumptions 1 to 5 are satisfied in this case and accordingly, the 
estimators based on Theorems 1 to 3 are (close to being) unbiased. In contrast, Assumption 6 does 
not hold because the direct effect of Z on the always takers is one. Therefore, the estimator based 
on Theorem 4 and those estimators based on Theorems 6 that require Assumption 6 are 
inconsistent. Assumption 7 is violated because 𝛼𝛼 = 0,𝛽𝛽 = 1  implies that 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1,0)|𝑛𝑛] −
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1,0)|𝑛𝑛] = 0, which is not equal to 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1,0)|𝑐𝑐] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1,0)|𝑐𝑐] = 1, so all estimators based 
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on Theorem 5 are not consistent either. Assumption 8 is satisfied such that estimation based on 
Assumptions 1-4 and 8 (see Theorem 6) is unbiased. Naïve OLS estimation is again inconsistent.  
 
Table A4: Simulations with 𝛼𝛼 = 0, 𝛽𝛽 = 𝛾𝛾 = 1 
  500 observations 
 
2000 observations 
  bias SD RMSE 
 
bias SD RMSE 
Direct effect never takers (Ass. 1-4) 0.01 0.19 0.19  0.00 0.09 0.09 
Direct effect always takers (Ass. 1-3, 5) 0.00 0.19 0.19  -0.00 0.09 0.09 
Total effect compliers (Ass. 1-5) 0.02 0.43 0.43  0.01 0.21 0.21 
Total effect compliers (Ass. 1-4, 6) 1.36 0.64 1.51  1.33 0.31 1.36 
Direct effect compliers under D=1  
(Ass. 1-3,5,8) 
0.01 0.12 0.12  0.01 0.06 0.06 
Direct effect compliers under D=1  
(Ass. 1-3,6,8) 
1.36 0.12 1.36  1.33 0.06 1.33 
Direct effect compliers under D=0  
(Ass. 1-4,7) 
-0.99 0.19 1.01  -1.00 0.09 1.00 
Indirect effect compliers under D=1  
(Ass. 1-3,5,7) 
1.01 0.19 1.03  1.01 0.09 1.01 
Indirect effect compliers under D=1  
(Ass. 1-3,6,7) 
2.36 0.43 2.40  2.33 0.21 2.34 
Indirect effect compliers under D=0 
(Ass. 1-4,8) 
0.01 0.64 0.64  0.00 0.31 0.31 
OLS direct effect -0.19 0.12 0.22  -0.18 0.06 0.19 
OLS indirect effect -0.64 0.12 0.65  -0.65 0.06 0.65 
Note: SD denotes the standard deviation, RMSE the root mean squared error of the respective estimator. 
 
In Table A5, we consider 𝛼𝛼 = 0,𝛽𝛽 = 1, 𝛾𝛾 = 0. Assumptions 1 to 4 hold such that the 
estimator based on Theorem 1 is consistent. Assumption 5 is violated because there exists a direct 
effect of Z for the compliers, but not for the always takers, while the effect of D is one for both 
groups. It follows that 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1,1)|𝑎𝑎] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1,1)|𝑎𝑎] = 1, which is different to 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1(1,1)|𝑐𝑐] −
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0(1,1)|𝑐𝑐] = 2. Accordingly, the estimators based on Theorems 2 and 3 are biased. In contrast, 
Assumption 6 is satisfied because 𝛾𝛾 = 0  such that the estimator based on Theorem 4 is 
consistent. Assumption 7 is violated because 𝛽𝛽 = 1, therefore the estimators based on Theorem 5 
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are asymptotically biased. In contrast, Assumption 8 is satisfied, such that those estimators based 
on Theorem 6 which do not rely on Assumption 5 are consistent. Naïve OLS does not yield any 
consistent effects.  
Table A5: Simulations with 𝛼𝛼 = 0,𝛽𝛽 = 1, 𝛾𝛾 = 0 
  N=500 
 
N=2000 
  bias SD RMSE 
 
bias SD RMSE 
Direct effect never takers (Ass. 1-4) -0.01 0.19 0.19  0.00 0.09 0.09 
Direct effect always takers (Ass. 1-3, 5) 0.43 0.19 0.47  0.43 0.10 0.44 
Total effect compliers (Ass. 1-5) -0.53 0.43 0.68  -0.56 0.21 0.60 
Total effect compliers (Ass. 1-4, 6) 0.05 0.53 0.53  0.01 0.27 0.27 
Direct effect compliers under D=1  
(Ass. 1-3,5,8) 
-0.53 0.12 0.54  -0.56 0.06 0.56 
Direct effect compliers under D=1  
(Ass. 1-3,6,8) 
0.04 0.12 0.13  0.01 0.06 0.06 
Direct effect compliers under D=0  
(Ass. 1-4,7) 
-1.01 0.19 1.02  -1.00 0.09 1.00 
Indirect effect compliers under D=1  
(Ass. 1-3,5,7) 
0.48 0.19 0.51  0.44 0.10 0.45 
Indirect effect compliers under D=1  
(Ass. 1-3,6,7) 
1.05 0.43 1.14  1.01 0.21 1.03 
Indirect effect compliers under D=0 
(Ass. 1-4,8) 
0.00 0.53 0.53  0.00 0.27 0.27 
OLS direct effect -0.47 0.12 0.48  -0.46 0.06 0.47 
OLS indirect effect -0.93 0.12 0.94  -0.93 0.06 0.94 
Note: SD denotes the standard deviation, RMSE the root mean squared error of the respective estimator. 
 
Table A6 provides the results for α = 1,β = γ = 0. This implies that Assumption 4 is 
violated, because E[Y1(0,0)|n] − E[Y0(0,0)|n] = −α = −1, which different to E[Y1(0,0)|c] −E[Y0(0,0)|c] = 0. The estimators based on Theorems 1, 3, and 4 are therefore biased, as well as 
that estimator based on Theorem 6 that requires Assumption 4. Note that α = 1,β = 0 also 
implies that E[Y1(1,0)|n] − E[Y0(1,0)|n] = −α = −1 , which is different to E[Y1(1,0)|c] −E[Y0(1,0)|c] = 0. Therefore, Assumption 7 is not satisfied and estimation based on Theorem 5 is 
inconsistent. In contrast, β = γ = 0 satisfies Assumptions 5 and 6 such that estimation based on 
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Theorem 2 is consistent. So are the estimators based on Theorem 6 that do not invoke Assumption 
4, because Assumption 8 holds. Naïve OLS estimation is again biased.  
Table A6: Simulations with 𝛼𝛼 = 1,𝛽𝛽 = 𝛾𝛾 = 0 
  N=500 
 
N=2000 
  bias SD RMSE 
 
bias SD RMSE 
Direct effect never takers (Ass. 1-4) -0.43 0.19 0.47  -0.43 0.10 0.45 
Direct effect always takers (Ass. 1-3, 5) 0.00 0.18 0.18  -0.00 0.09 0.09 
Total effect compliers (Ass. 1-5) 0.60 0.52 0.79  0.59 0.26 0.64 
Total effect compliers (Ass. 1-4, 6) 0.61 0.53 0.81  0.59 0.27 0.64 
Direct effect compliers under D=1  
(Ass. 1-3,5,8) 
0.03 0.12 0.12  0.02 0.06 0.06 
Direct effect compliers under D=1  
(Ass. 1-3,6,8) 
0.03 0.12 0.12  0.02 0.06 0.06 
Direct effect compliers under D=0  
(Ass. 1-4,7) 
-0.43 0.19 0.47  -0.43 0.10 0.45 
Indirect effect compliers under D=1  
(Ass. 1-3,5,7) 
1.03 0.18 1.04  1.02 0.09 1.03 
Indirect effect compliers under D=1  
(Ass. 1-3,6,7) 
1.03 0.52 1.16  1.02 0.26 1.05 
Indirect effect compliers under D=0 
(Ass. 1-4,8) 
0.57 0.53 0.78  0.57 0.27 0.62 
OLS direct effect 0.32 0.12 0.34  0.32 0.06 0.32 
OLS indirect effect -1.15 0.12 1.15  -1.15 0.06 1.15 
Note: SD denotes the standard deviation, RMSE the root mean squared error of the respective estimator. 
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